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DISCUSSIONS AND REPLIES
SESSIONV
might not have time to perform extensive soil
tests. But even then, I am of the opinion that
if the designer had the knowledge of the
behavior of the soils under different drainage
conditions and design of retaining walls, this
damage could have been easily avoided by
simply considering the effect of upper wall on
the lower one and by providing the proper
drainage system. Any engineer who has basic
concept of forces and moments, can not make a
mistake of ignoring the effect of upper wall
on the lower one. Provision of proper drainage
system definitely requires the knowledge of
geotechnical engineering.

Discussion by Shamsher Prakash
Prof. Civil Engineering Dept.
University of Missouri-Rolla
on
"Braced Excavation at the NIPSCO Bailly Station Power Plant"
Paper No. 5.25
Reconstruction of intake and discharge lines at NIPS CO plant was
interesting, but the original collapse of the pipes would also be an
interestin~ case history.
What can you tell us about the collapse of the pipes, and what can
we learn from it?

Discussion by Sanjeev Kumar
Assistant Engineer,
Punjab State Electricity Board,
Punjab, India
on
Failure of Twenty-Foot High Wall:
From case Histories

The designer also designed a cantilever
retaining wall exceeding 26 ft in height for
some of the portion in the same project·
cantilever retaining walls are uneconomical
above 20 ft height of wall. Provision of
counterfort retaining wall would have been
more appropriate.

Learning

Failure is a full scale destructive test and
gives useful information to guide future
endeavors. It is lesson for which price has
already been paid. If the similar failure can
be avoided by learning a lesson from the
earlier failure, this can be considered a
price to progress. This case history once
again reminded that a work in the hands of a
amateur will lead to mess.

Paper No. 5.31
"A little knowledge is a dangerous thing" this
proverb has been proved by the author here. A
double cantilever wall system with a lower
wall of about 16 ft height and above that a
wall of about 10 ft height, in central Texas
collapsed after a period of rain fall, within
two months of its completion. The reason was
inadequate design.
The wall
system was
designed by a registered professional engineer
who was 'a generalist and did design work in
most areas of civil engineering, but was not
trained specially in geotechnical engineering.
the
designer
literally
followed
the
recommendations in the standard handbook for
civil engineers without understanding the
limitations of such design and apparently saw
little need to perform extensive soil tests.

Discussion by J. N. G6mez S.
Partner, Geotechnical Branch
C.I.C. Ltda, Bogota, COLOMBIA.
Professor of Advanced Soil Mechanics, Javeriana
University, Bogota, COLOMBIA.
on
Failure of a Twenty-Foot High
Retaining Wall
Paper No. 5.31
The failure of a double cantiliver
retaining wall is presented. The upper wall
(UW) is 10 ft (3 m) high and the lower one (LW)
is 16 ft (5 m). Total wall system height is
26ft (8 m). It failed in a length of about 100
ft (30m). Soil investigation at the site was
rather poor: borings were not drilled and test
were limited to soil classification.
The
design of the wall system had basic erroneous
assumptions such as to consider the walls
separately rather than designing the LW taking
into account the active effect of the UW on it.
On the other hand, no overall stability
analysis was performed.

Main shortcomings in the design reported by
the author were 1) two wall sections were
analyzed separately and the effect of upper
wall on the lower one was ignored 2) no slope
stability type analysis were performed to
examine the possibility of an overall failure
3) improper drainage system to drain water
from the back of the wall and 4) high wallsoil friction coefficient.
Since there was an interest in getting the
project in operation and the wall may have
been a late addition to the design, there
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The
author
carried
out
a
site
investigation, reviewed the original design and
undertook a design of the LW taking into
account the effect of the UW. The scope of the
study included two phases: the first one dealt
with the calculation of the lateral force upon
the LW imposed both by the weight of the soil
wedge above it and the UW, and the second one,
consisted in evaluating the safety factors of
the LW against overturning, sliding and bearing
capacity. There was not sufficient information
such as the original soil profile, to perform
a realistic overall stability analysis.

Discussion by Dr. Eyjolfur Ami Rafusson
Honnun Ud., Consulting Engineers, ICELAND
on
Failure of a Twenty-Foot High Retaining Wall
Paper No. 5.31
A failure of 20' high retaining wall, designed and constructed
to provide area for parking spaces and driveways for a shopping
center in central Texas, has been discussed in tbis paper. The failure
"led to losses in excess of $1 Ji:lillion for the designer". The retaining
wall was a 1300' (-400 m) long with a maximum height of 26'9"
(-8.2 m), measured from the top of the keyway. The presence of a
high concrete wall was objected by the city environmentalists. Thus, a
relatively low single wall was designed over much of the length and
where the wall was higher than about 15' (-4.6 m) a double wall was
designed, over 700' (-210 m) long. A vegetation was planned in
between the two walls. Site investigation for the wall design was
limited. The designer practically followed the Standard Handbook of
Civil Engineers, by Meritt. Factor of safety against tilting was
sufficient, calculated about the toe. The effect of the upper wall on
the lower one was ignored, overall stability was ignored, sliding factor
of safety was only about 1.0, the toe stress was high. Drainage was,
for both walls, provided by 2" diameter PVC drainage tubes. The
wall is believed to have been completely backfilled in May. In late
July, after a period of heavy rain, a 135' (-41 m) long section of the
lower wall began to displace horizontally. The wall continued to move
horizontally at a slow rate. Post-failure soil investigation showed that
the fi11, which not failed, was partly a dty granular fill. The fill that
had failed was soft rocky clay, h.avingf LL=54, PL=33, and wc=31
%. The fill seemed to be "reasonably well compacted". Drained direct
shear tests (4) showed both peak and residual effective cohesi()Jl as
100 psf ( 4.8 kPa), but effeclive fiiction angle as 25° and 16° for peak
and residual conditions, respectively. Post-failure stability analysis of
the retaining wall showed that factor of safety against tilting was
sufficient while it was far from being sufficient against sliding, bearing
capacity, and overall stability. It should be kept in mind that actually
only the lower wall is of a concern. The main conclusion of the
paper, that "engineers should not practice out of their areas of training
and experience", is a necessazy warning that always should be kept in
mind. Why did the wall stand up at all? It is the discusser believe that
negative pore pressure may have helped initially. Following the rain a
positive pore pressure, ineffeclive drainage system, and the designer
lack of knowledge was the main cause of the wa.11 failure. The paper
should be read by evety engineer as a lesson on how things can
easily go wrong although they look simple.

The work is valuable, well documented and
comprehensive. A cross section of the site,
however, showing the idealized soil profile
after failure, obtained from the results of the
site investigation would have been helpful.
Figure 1 summarizes the results of the author's
analysis in terms of safety factors for drained
and undrained conditions. It is clear that the
LW could not be stable from the bearing
capacity and sliding points of view. It was
founded on weak soil and supporting a load of
about 15 kips/ft (22.4 ton/m).
The writer would stress among other facts
included in the paper, that special attention
has to be paid to bearing capacity and sliding
checks, rather than following common and
established practice
of
calculation for
retaining wall design presented in many civil
engineering
books.
When
geotechnical
parameters are involved in the design of a
structure, geotechnical judgment and expertise
coupled with a site investigation program are
important in order to understand the behavior
of it and to select the appropiate strength of
the materials involved.
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Reply by R. E. Olson
on
Paper No. 5.31.
In his discussion, Mr. Gomez asks for more information
on an idealized soil profile. In the immediate area of the
failure, the wall was underlain by a deep layer of clay
shale, possibly as much as 100m thick. In the upper ten
meters, the clay shale contained seams of limestone with
the thickness of each seam about 10 em, and a vertical
spacing of the order of one meter. Some borings showed
similar seams of gypsum. Standard penetration
resistances at shallow depth were 67 to 87 blows/30 em
and unconfined compressive strengths on cores were
usually around 520-570 kPa (5.5 to 6.0 tst). Along most
of the length of the wall, where failure did not occur, the
ground surface was higher then in the failure zone, the
wall therefore not so tall, and the wall was underlain by
up to 3 meters of solid limestone overlying the deep
shale.

Mr. Gomez emphasized the need to consider sliding and
bearing capacity failure modes. The author agrees and
emphasized in the paper the difficulties associated with
attempts to calculate, and limit, toe stresses instead of
considering the overall bearing capacity mode of failure.
Mr. Kumar observed that cantilever walls of this height
are not economical and suggested use of a counterfort
wall. Design calculations, obtained during litigation,
gave no indication that the designer considered other
alternatives. It appears that cantilever walls were used
because they were covered in the civil engineering
handbooks. However, counterfort walls would generally
not be economical in the United States because of the
increased labor costs. During the remedial phase of the
work consideration was given to using reinforced earth
and other walls with shallow foundations and tie backs
but none were stable in the bearing capacity mode.
Finally, the natural slope was reformed and the parking
was provided on a structural slab constructed out over the
slope. The slab was supported on deep drilled piers.
Dr. Rafnsson believes that the wall was initially stable
because of negative pore water pressures in the backfill.
The paper includes several reasons why the wall stood up
in spite of low calculated factors of safety. The fourth
reason listed was negative pore water pressures in the
backfill. The rainfall that immediately preceded the
failure apparently diminished these negative pore water
pressures and also increased water pressures directly in
the walls.
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